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THE INTERESTS OF LAND-LOCKED STATES
IN LAW OF THE SEAS
I. TNTRODUCTI0N
Approximately one fifth of the nations of the world are land-
locked, having no direct access to the sea within the bounds of their
territorial jurisdiction.' These nations, throughout modern history,
have sought to secure for themselves various rights that the coastal
nations inherently have due to geographical location. The tradi-
tional demand of the inland countries has been that of unrestrained
access to the sea, but now, with the significant strides that oceanic
sciences have made in the last two decades, their demands have
spread into other areas that once held little interest to inland coun-
tries.
It has become apparent in recent years that the resources of the
sea are going to play an ever-increasing part in the economic pic-
ture of the world. Where the sea was once looked upon as a source
of animal and plant products, it will now be expected to supply a
growing population with a variety of mineral and hydrocarbon re-
sources as well. Although the feasibility of extracting specific min-
erals may be in doubt for the present, there seems to be little con-
tention that in the near future, mineral extraction will proceed and
the harvests will be quite substantial.
2
1. Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Lesotho, Mal-
awi, Mali, Niger, Rhodesia, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Upper Volta and
Zambia (Africa); Afghanistan, Bhutan (U.N. Member, Sept. 21, 1971), Laos,
Mongolia, Nepal (Asia); Austria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, San Marino, and Switzerland (Eu-
rope); Bolivia and Paraguay (South America). All of the above nations are
either members of the United Nations or of some specialized agency of the
United Nations. UNION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONs, 21 YEARBOOK or
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS at 17-21 (12th ed. 1969). Other states that
might be included are Sikkim and Tibet (Asia); Andorra and State of
Vatican City (Europe).
2. See Schaefer, The Resources of the Seabed and Prospective Rates of
Development as a Basis of Planning for International Management in
THE LAW OF T=E SEA: THE UNITED NATIONS AND OcEAN MANAGEMENT 71
(Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Insti-
tute, 1970).
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The land-locked states have a great interest in the results of any
massive harvest of ocean resources. Many of their interests are
shared with coastal states; some are unique. While all mineral
exporting nations may suffer from a price slump at the international
market place, only the inland countries carry the burden of over-
land transportation costs. The flood of resources from the sea
would be that much more severe on the inland states. Likewise,
while most coastal nations could expect at least some return from
the minerals of their shores, the inland countries would receive
nothing.
Because land-locked states suffer the same population problems
that others do, a new interest in the sea as a source of protein has
developed. Indeed, many land-locked nations have developed ex-
tensive markets within their borders for fish and fish products.
This has fostered a desire by these countries to see that proper con-
servation techniques are adhered to so that their source is pre-
served and the product price remains minimal.
These factors have led the inland countries to voice a greater con-
cern as to the state of the world oceans. The demand for participa-
tion by these nations has been voiced in the General Assembly of
the United Nations; and it is evident, both by General Assembly
resolutions reserving the sea bed for mankind3 and by resolutions
aimed specifically at the interests of the inland states,4 that these
demands have been heard. The year 1973 will offer the opportu-
nity many of the inland states, along with other smaller and under-
developed coastal states, have sought in order to express their de-
mands and to make these assertions a part of the international law.
In 1973 a United Nations conference on the law of the seas has been
scheduled. 5 It is also, very likely, the last year in which a uniform
plan of regulation, embodying all of the varied interests that the
under-developed nations have, can be drawn up and enacted
before oceanic technology advances to such an extent that the au-
thority these nations could have wielded will have been usurped.
A comprehensive body of work resulting from this conference, in-
cluding more than mere token recognition of the problems, would
be more preferable than the patchwork and kaleidoscopic revisions
which would surely be the result if the interests of the land-locked
3. G.A. Res. 2340 (XXII) (1967), 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 174 (1968);
G.A. Res. 2467 A-D (XXIII) (1968), 8 INT'L LEGAL IVIATERALS 201 (1969);
G.A. Res. 2574 A-D (XXIV) (1969), 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERILS 419 (1970).
4. G.A. Res. 2750 C (XXV) (1970), 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 226 (1971).
The resolution was adopted by 108 to 7, with 5 abstentions. The Soviet
bloc voted against the resolution.
5. G.A. Res. 2750 A-D (XXV) (1970), 10 INT'L LEGAL MVATRmiLs 224
(1971).
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countries are not adequately expressed and adamantly contended.
The impact resulting from the development of marine resources
cannot be accurately measured at such an early date, yet some gen-
eralizations may be made and some obvious consequences pointed
out with respect to the long-term effects.
II. AccEss
Perhaps the most evident disadvantage the inland countries suf-
fer is the absence of a seaport. The availability of a seaport, of
course, has a total effect on the economy of any country. Regard-
less of the immediate returns of the sea, such as plant, animal, and
mineral goods, the sea offers an avenue for trade development with
the rest of the world that cannot be matched by overland routes.
Not only does the sea offer the cheapest mode of transportation, but
in many instances it offers the only way in which international mar-
kets can be reached. For this reason, those nations with direct
oceanic access find the resource an absolute necessity, while those
without have strived to attain this franchise from neighboring
coastal nations.6
Legal justification for the right of access has traditionally been
based on such concepts as natural law, servitudes of necessity, and
the freedom of the high seas.7 The establishment of legal philoso-
phies to justify the position of inland states had little effect on those
nations that would have to grant the rights sought, so the problem
was solved by bilateral treaties between the individual nations 8
Bilateral treaties, however, often have distinct disadvantages to the
land-locked states. The price a land-locked nation would have to
pay to bring about such transit treaties was very high when com-
6. Virtually every land-locked state has only one state between itself
and oceanic access.
7. D. BOWETT, THE LAW OF THE SEA 50 (1967) (hereinafter cited as
BoWETT). But see Johnson, The Preparation of the 1958 Geneva Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, 8 INT'L AND COMP. L. Q. 122, 139 (1959) ("By
no stretch of the imagination can the question of overland transit be brought
within the regime of the sea.").
8. Id., see, e.g., Convention of Mannheim, done Oct. 17, 1968, 20 Recueil
de Traites 355 (1875); Treaty of Commerce and Fluvial Navigation Between
Brazil and Bolivia, done Aug. 12, 1910, 7 Recueil de Traites (ser. 3) 632
(1913). See generally J. MOORE, 1 A DIGEST OF INTERwATIONAL LAW § 131
at 627-53 (1906); Borel, Freedom of Navigation on the Rhine, in THE BirTSns
YEAR BooK OF INTE=xATIONAL LAW 1921-22 at 75; G. IIAcKWORTH, 1 DIGEST
OF INTERATIONAL LAW §§ 87-89 at 596-613 (Dep't of State, 1940).
pared to the minor cost suffered by the coastal nation, which was
merely allowing the use of an inexhaustable natural resource. No
matter how strong the wording of the treaty, the land-locked state
would remain dependent to some extent upon the coastal state
through which it traversed.
Economic Necessity
It is, then, no surprise that in this age of world powers, world
economics, and world politics, inland countries are seeking to secure
broader and stronger rights in this respect than could be offered
by the bilateral treaty. Many of the inland countries are as yet un-
der-developed. To these countries, reaching world markets is a nec-
essity upon which any future development hinges. The delays and
added costs suffered by inland countries can operate to defeat any
proposed investment, especially if the return expected is somewhat
marginal in the first place. Although most products, in any
country, must travel at least some distance to a port of departure,
the land-locked countries have no control over the land-transport
facilities of the neighboring coastal nations and must therefore ac-
cept these as the only mode of transportation available. The effect
of this situation can be demonstrated by events in the Central Afri-
can Republic. There, substantial uranium deposits were discovered
and thought to be of profitable quality. However, because the
uranium ore would have had to be carried one thousand kilometers
to the port of Dovela, Cameroon, the cost of transportation became
a distinct disadvantage to the prospective investors (Japanese) and
an otherwise profitable investment must now be considered mar-
ginal at best.9
Problems associated with access can be considerably lessened by
the presence of rivers on which sea-going vessels can traverse.
Hence, Paraguay can reach the outside world through the Parana
River and its many and large tributaries.' 0 Switzerland is in a simi-
larly advantageous position. It maintains a merchant marine on
the Rhine," and more than one-fourth of its foreign trade passes
through its home port, Basel. Other countries among the inland
states also have direct access to the sea via navigable rivers, but
9. 67 M24ExAL TRADE NoTEs (No. 6) 27-28 (U.S. Dep't Interior, 1970).
10. Principally the Paraguay and Pilcomayo rivers. See generally
Brown, Transport and Economic Integration of South America, 8 DEVELOP-
MENT DIGEST (No. 1) 3, 7-11 (1970).
11. 1 THE EuRoPA YEARBOOK 1155 (1971). See THE WORLDS MERcHANT
FLEET, infra note 42; R. BAXTER, THm LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS 17-
18. See also C. COLomBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 312 at
294 (6th ed. 1967) (hereinafter cited as COLOrMBOS).
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such cases are exceptions rather than the rule among this group.
For example, although countries may have abundant water re-
sources and many large rivers, ocean access may be made impossi-
ble by the treacherous rapids that abound among these rivers. It
is also not uncommon to find countries with riparian resources suf-
fering a disadvantage because of the shallowness of their water-
ways, thereby limiting navigation only to vessels of limited ca-
pacity, resulting in the loss of quantity exports. This, of course,
severely limits traffic and nearly eliminates any chance of contin-
ual and low-cost transportation modes between these countries and
outside markets.
African land-locked states have much the same problem. While
Africa has six large rivers,12 many land-locked states are cut off
from direct ocean traffic by intraversable rapids.' 3 Furthermore,
many of Africa's rivers never reach the sea at all due to the ex-
treme dryness that is characteristic of so much of the continent.
The problem of access is not merely one of transportation costs
and economics. Reaching world markets can become a decidedly
easy objective when compared to the difficulties that can arise
when goods are imported into the inland countries. Besides the
basic transportation costs that have to be paid to the coastal na-
tions, there are administrative costs, customs, possible legal con-
flicts, and political necessities which must be considered.' 4 An ex-
treme example of the hardships a land-locked country must suffer
when its transit rights are divested may be demonstrated by the
problems faced by Zambia upon Rhodesia's bid for independence 15
and the subsequent United Nations economic sanctions. The coun-
try found itself with absolutely no petroleum at hand; the total sup-
ply of fuel had to be air-lifted in, resulting in staggering costs and
a perpetual shortage.
To the coastal state, restrictions placed upon the importation of
goods must seem logical indeed. Not only are such restrictions a
12. Nile, Congo, Niger, Zambezi, Orange and Limpopo.
13. The Nile, the longest river on earth, has only one thousand miles
of navigable water over its entire four thousand mile length. To some
extent, this is characteristic of all the large African rivers.
14. Makil, Transit Rights of Land-locked Countries, 4 J. WoRLD TRADE
LAw 35 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Makil).
15. MacDonald, Economic Sanctions in the International System, 7
CANADIAN YEARBOOK INTL LAw 61 (1969); 21 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITErD NA-
TIONS 125-158 (1969). See INT'L L. STruDEs 1963 (U.S. Naval War College)
at 317-415.
possible source of revenue, but they can also serve the economic
and political needs of a country. As it would be absurd to allow
political enemies in an inland country to obtain weapons to be used
against the littoral state, it must also seem equally absurd to allow
a potential economic competitor to obtain a foot-hold in the world
market. Such concerns were very real on the African continent at
one time, although there is evidence that for the time being, at-
tempts are being made to pacify these fears of economic (and mili-
tary) superiority.'6
Unification and Conventions
The vocalization of demands has increased in the last two dec-
ades. 17 If the countries of inland status are not as yet unified into
a working group, there is at least evidence that the demands as-
serted are common to the majority of these nations. Hence, re-
cently in the United Nations General Assembly the representatives
of Afghanistan,' 8 Austria,19 Bolivia,20 Burundi, Chad, Lesotho,
Mali, Niger, Paraguay, Swaziland, Upper Volta, and Zambia de-
manded that the United Nations take an active role in seeing that
the rights of land-locked nations are finalized and respected.2 1
Transit rights, at least to some extent, have been given further sub-
stance by the International Court. Cases have held that the his-
torical exercise of transit rights can establish a legal status quo.22
While of doubtful international consequence, the cases are, per-
haps, philosophical victories.
Modern attempts to formalize the rules of transit by inland
countries generally find their basis in the Convention on the Free-
16. See Matthews, Interstate Conflicts in Africa: A Review, 24 INT'L
ORGANIZATION 335 (1970) for an excellent synopsis of the problems.
17. See, e.g., The Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked Coun-
tries, note 27, infra. See generally Friedheim, Factor Analysis as a Tool in
Studying the Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA 47, 67 (L. Alexander
ed. 1967).
18. See 8 U.N. MONTHLY CimoN. (No. 4) 25 (1971).
19. Id.
20. See 8 U.N. MONTHLY CnRoN. (No. 1) 40 (1971).
21. Id. at 39.
22. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (1960] I.C.J. 42. Portugal
claimed the right to traverse through Indian territory so that it could re-
main in constant contact with two Portuguese enclaves: Dadra and Nagar-
Aveli. The basic right of passage was based upon a treaty dating back
approximately one hundred and seventy years. Although India successfully
repudiated the effectiveness of the treaty, the Portuguese right of transit
was affirmed by the court, over the Indian objections, because of the con-
tinual usage over the extended period of time. The court's decision, how-
ever, was such that only non-military goods and personnel could traverse
through Indian territory. See E. HAMBRO, THE CASE LAW OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT 1959-1963 at § 185 (1966).
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dom of Transit, established in Barcelona in 1921.23 Although some-
what limited in authority and scope, perhaps due to the methods
of transportation in 1921, the Barcelona Convention did lay the
ground work for later international agreements of comparatively
greater importance.24 Of these later attempts at codification, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade25 (GATT), the Conven-
tion on the High Seas (1958),26 and the Convention on Transit
Trade of Land-locked Countries27 are the foremost examples of sub-
stantive provisions in the area and therefore should be treated
separately.
GATT
The GATT is not directed specifically at the interests of the land-
locked nations, but nevertheless does contribute to the facilitation
of their demands. Article V of the GATT 28 is particularly impor-
23. 7 L.N.T.S. 12, done April 20, 1921. See Toulmin, The Barcelona Con-
ference on Communications and Transit and the Danube Statute, in THE
BRITISH YEAR Boox OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1922-23, at 167; G. HACKWORTH,
4 DIGEST OF INTmATIONAL LAW § 363 at 345-46, 355 (Dept of State, 1942);
BowETT, supra note 6 at 50. See also The Right to a Flag Having no Sea
Coast, 7 L.N.T.S. 74, done April 20, 1921; LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT Art.
23, para. (e) (facilitation of trade and commerce); CoLomnos, supra note 11
§ 246 at 239.
24. See Makil, supra note 14, at 36.
25. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. (hereinafter cited as GATT). The General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade, with annexes, was not signed as a separ-
ate document. It is attached to the Final Act of the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Employment, signed at Geneva Oct. 30, 1947. There
are more than eighty contracting parties. TREATIES IN FORcE 310 (Dep't of
State, 1972).
26. The Convention on the High Seas; [1962] pt. 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958; entered into force
for the United States September 30, 1962. Approximately forty-nine states
are parties to the Convention. TRATIES iN FORCE 332 (Dep't of State,
1972).
27. The Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked Countries; [1965]
pt. 5 U.S.T. 7383; T.I.A.S. 6592; 597 U.N.T.S. 42. Done at New York July 8,
1965, entered into force for the United States Nov. 28, 1968. As of Janu-
ary, 1972, twenty-four parties had signed the Convention. TREATIES IN
FORc E 384 (Dep't of State, 1972). U.N. Doc. TD/Transit/9: 9 INT'L LEGAL
M[ATERIALS 957 (1965).
28. Article V provides:
1. Goods (including baggage), and also vessels and other means
of transport, shall be deemed to be in transit across the terri-
tory of a contracting party when the passage across such
territory, with or without transhipment, warehousing, break-
tant in that the article covers international transit in general and
therefore, at least by implication, encompasses the problems faced
by so many of the land-locked states. In this respect, the GATT be-
comes an important instrument of international law to these states
and is consequently worthy of some consideration.
Paragraph two of Article V provides that each contracting party
shall allow the goods of another contracting party to pass through
its borders unhindered, regardless of the origin, destination, or fac-
tors relating to ownership of the goods in question. In addition,
the paragraph states that the flag of transport vessels shall be ir-
relevant in the considerations of any nation as to the passage of
ing bulk, or change in the mode of transport, is only a portion
of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the
frontier of the contracting party across whose territory the
traffic passes. Traffic of this nature is termed in this Article
"traffic in transit".
2. There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each
contracting party, via the routes most convenient for interna-
tional transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory of
other contracting parties. No distinction shall be made which
is based on the flag of vessels, the place of origin, departure,
entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to
the ownership of goods, of vessels or other means of transport.
3. Any contracting party may require that traffic in transit
through its territory be entered at the proper custom house,
but, except in cases of failure to comply with applicable cus-
toms laws and regulations, such traffic coming from or going
to the territory of other contracting parties shall not be subject
to any unnecessary delays or restrictions and shall be exempt
from customs duties and from all transit duties or other
charges imposed in respect of transit, except charges for trans-
portation or those commensurate with administrative ex-
penses entailed by transit or with the cost of services rendered.
4. All charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties on
traffic in transit to or from the territories of other contracting
parties shall be reasonable, having regard to the conditions of
the traffic.
5. With respect to all charges, regulations and formalities in
connection with transit, each contracting party shall accord to
traffic in transit to or from the territory of any other contract-
ing party treatment no less favourable than the treatment ac-
corded to traffic in transit to or from any third country.
6. Each contracting party shall accord to products which have
been in transit through the territory of any other contracting
party treatment no less favourable than that which would have
been accorded to such products had they been transported from
their place of origin to their destination without going through
the territory of such other contracting party. Any contracting
party shall, however, be free to maintain its requirements of
direct consignment existing on the date of this Agreement in
respect of any goods in regard to which such direct consignment
is a requisite condition of eligibility for the entry of the goods
at preferential rates of duty or has relation to the contracting
party's prescribed method of valuation for duty purposes.
7. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to the operation
of aircraft in transit, but shall apply to air transit of goods
(including baggage).
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goods. Paragraph two and its seemingly generous provisions are
somewhat mitigated by paragraphs three, four and five. Para-
graph three, while ostensibly removing transit charges, is written
in language so nebulous that an agreement as to what is actually
meant would seem almost impossible. Unjustified restrictions and
delays are condemned, yet administrative expenses and service
charges are allowed. Furthermore, a contracting party may require
that goods in transit be entered at customs, thereby reducing any
practical benefits that might have otherwise accrued to inland na-
tions. The fact that the goods may be required to enter customs im-
mediately implies that a coastal nation may still retain control over
the exports and imports of an inland neighbor. Paragraphs four
and five do little to ameliorate this interpretation. The former stip-
ulates that regulations and charges shall be reasonable and com-
mensurate with traffic conditions. The latter states that traffic in
transit to or from one country shall be accorded treatment equal to
that granted any other country. As to paragraph four, it is readily
apparent that customs and administration costs can be construed as
traffic conditions. Paragraph five has no applicability in that it
grants no rights in respect to the unimpeded flow of goods to and
from a land-locked country; it merely equalizes the burdens among
the states.
Although Article V is seemingly broad enough, it leaves certain
aspects of the transit rights which it purports to regulate in doubt.
While paragraphs one and two appear to give uncontestable rights
to the contracting parties, it is obvious that paragraph three does in
fact limit the effectiveness of the argument. Not only are the "ap-
plicable" custom laws determined by the state over which transit is
sought, but, furthermore, there is no provision which prevents "ad-
ministrative" expenses from becoming a hidden tax. The final re-
sult of the GATT Article V provisions, then, seems to be that the
inland contracting parties may export goods, somewhat easier than
otherwise, through the territory of contracting coastal states, but
problems as to the importation of goods still remain because of the
vagueness of paragraph three.
1958 Convention on the High Seas
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas provides perhaps the most
important concessions yet achieved by the land-locked countries.
Articles 2, 3 and 4 relate directly to the interests of the inland coun-
tries, and, being a part of what might be termed a major internation-
al agreement, lay forth rules that can be easily utilized as a basis
for subsequent annexations. The major weakness in the articles
lies in their vagueness as to what rights are actually vested in the
inland contracting parties. That is to say, while the intent seems
clear enough in the composition of the articles, there appears to be
no basis of authority inherent in the articles themselves. Conse-
quently, the inland countries suffer because the most controversial
aspects of the Convention are usurped by the cursory treatment
given.
Of the three articles mentioned, Article 3 carries the greatest im-
pact with respect to the demands of the land-locked countries. Ar-
ticle 229 is an introduction to the subject in general, declaring that
the high seas are an international matter in scope and not subject
to the sovereignty of any one nation. Article 4, which shall be dis-
cussed later, purports to give land-locked countries the right to sail
under a flag of national origin. Article 3 is as follows:
Article 3
1. In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on equal terms with
coastal States, States having no seacoast should have free access to
the sea. To this end States situated between the sea and a State
having no seacoast shall by common agreement with the latter and
in conformity with existing international conventions accord:
(a) To the State having no seacoast, on a basis of reciprocity,
free transit through their territory and
(b) To ships flying the flag of that state treatment equal to that
accorded to their own ships, or to the ships of any other
states, as regards access to seaports and the use of such
ports.
2. States situated between the sea and a State having no seacoast
shall settle, by mutual agreement with the latter, and taking into
account the rights of the coastal State or State of transit and the
special conditions of the State having no seacoast, all matters relat-
ing to freedom of transit and equal treatment in ports, in case such
States are not already parties to existing international conventions.
29. Article 2 provides:
The high seas being open to all nations, no state may validly
purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom
of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by
these articles and by the other rules of international law. It com-
prises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal states:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general
principles of international law shall be exercised by all states
with reasonable regard to the interest of other states in their ex-
ercise of the freedom of the high seas.
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Paragraph one of Article 3 outwardly appears to be very impor-
tant to the land-locked nations in that it purports to grant free ac-
cess to the sea to those countries lacking coasts. However, the fran-
chise is severely limited by the qualifying phraseology which makes
common agreement a necessity precedent to any exercise. Of
course, it would seem only just that the coastal nations be allowed
to preserve their national interests, but the need for common agree-
ment, as expressed here, implies that while the international con-
vention recognizes the right of transit-and even the necessity-
no provision will be made to guarantee or facilitate the establish-
ment of such a right between the contracting parties. The use of
the word "should" in paragraph one exemplifies the reluctance, on
the part of the international community, to take a firm position on
this matter.
This interpretation is made even more evident by paragraph two
which seems to invalidate completely the effectiveness of para-
graph one. Indeed, there seems little purpose in including Article
2 at all if the sole effect is to grant only those rights which were
already obtained by previous agreements and conventions, or
those rights which are readily obtainable in the future. This has
led some writers to feel that the inclusion of Article 3 in the Con-
vention on the High Seas serves for little more than a moral vic-
tory.30 Others have speculated that the practical consequences of
the Convention, in respect to the land-locked countries, are so
minimal as to give the coastal nations the power to exclude any per-
son or resource that they so desire.31
Conclusions such as these may be perfectly justified, but a moral
victory, even if of no practical consequence, is far better for the in-
terests of the inland countries than the complete absence of con-
sideration by the Convention. As William T. Burke implies, all
international agreements, whether they be bilateral or multilateral,
have the effect of softening the impact of their inclusion into sub-
sequent international law in a more relevant form; and they there-
fore serve to expand the international law in the long run by down-
playing national interests.3 2 The inclusion of Article 3 will necessi-
30. BowETT, supra note 7, at 51.
31. M. McDouGAL & W. BuRiKE, THE PUmLic ORDEn or THE OcFAn s 65-66
(1962).
32. W. Bun, MAmNE Sc3IucE RESEARCH AND INERINATIOXAL LAW 18
(Law of the Sea Institute, Occasional Paper No. 8, 1970). Cf. Vienna Con-
tate research on the problem in future conventions, and conse-
quently lay open the ground work for concessions of an even
broader nature.
The Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked Countries
The importance of the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-
locked Countries is two-fold. First, it is an attempt to establish a
framework in international law that grants not merely the rights
associated with access, but further, a method whereby those rights
can be enforced against the contracting parties. Secondly, the con-
vention was drawn up by many nations who were either not repre-
sented at the formulation of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas
or who were not yet in existence. There is no doubt that the more
representative participation by inland countries contributed to the
strengthening of demands.
The Convention on Transit Trade is made up of twenty-three ar-
ticles, of which sixteen are substantive. The basis of the Conven-
tion on Transit Trade is Article 2. Provisions are made there for
freedom in transit that go far beyond those of previous conventions,
both in degree and in scope. Article 2 provides:
Article 2
Freedom of Transit
1. Freedom of transit shall be granted under the terms of this
Convention for traffic in transit and means of transport. Subject
to the other provisions of this Convention, the measures taken by
Contracting States for regulating and forwarding traffic across their
territory shall facilitate traffic in transit on routes in use mutually
acceptable for transit to the Contracting States concerned. Con-
sistent with the terms of this Convention, no discrimination shall
be exercised which is based on the place of origin, departure, en-
try, exit or destination or on any circumstances relating to the own-
ership of the goods or the ownership, place of registration or flag
of vessels, land vehicles or other means of transport used.
2. The rules governing the use of means of transport, when they
pass across part or the whole of the territory of another Contract-
ing State, shall be established by common agreement among the
Contracting States concerned, with due regard to the multilateral
international conventions to which these States are parties.
3. Each Contracting State shall authorize, in accordance with its
laws, rules and regulations, the passage across or access to its ter-
ritory of persons whose movement is necessary for traffic in transit.
4. The Contracting States shall permit the passage of traffic in
transit across their territorial waters in accordance with the princi-
ples of customary international law or applicable international con-
ventions and with their internal regulations.
vention on the Law of Treaties Art. 30; opened for signature May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 8 INT'L LEGAL MATEmLS 679, 691 (1969) (The ap-
plication of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter)
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Although paragraph two calls for common agreement between
the contracting parties with respect to the means of transportation,
other articles set forth the principles under which these common
agreements must be made. Article 4 states that the contracting na-
tions attempt to establish adequate transport facilities at points of
entry and exit so that the flow of goods can pass unhindered and
without unnecessary delay. Furthermore, Article 3 and Article 5
provide that traffic in transit not be subject to any special customs,
dues, or taxes, with special provisions to ensure that administrative
expenses do not end up serving this purpose, a very real threat un-
der the GATT. 33
Most interesting are those sections governing the obligations of
the coastal states to the traffic in transit as to difficulties that may
occur during the process of travel. Even though the coastal na-
tions are not bound to allow such ". . . goods of a kind of which
the importation is prohibited, either on grounds of public morals,
public health or security, or as a precaution against disease of ani-
mals or plants or against pests,"34 they are obligated to provide
storage facilities at least equal to their own,35 to avoid delay in
transit,30 and to protect both the safety of the goods and the
route.37 Except in emergencies 38 or in time of war,39 the littoral
states are obligated to cooperate towards the removal of any im-
pediment or obstruction to the free flow of goods.40 Should the
parties fail to reach an agreement, under Article 16, a commission
would be appointed to arbitrate the matter upon the request of ei-
ther state. The commission would be composed of one representa-
tive from each of the disputing nations and a third member, to be
made chairman, who is agreeable to both parties. The resolution
of the dispute would be determined by a majority vote.
Article 16 is significant because it guarantees the rights of the
land-locked states in a way that neither the GATT nor the 1958
33. GATT, supra note 28, Art. V., para. 3. See generally Hudec, The
GATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L.
615 (1970).
34. The Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked Countries, supra
note 27, Art. 11, para. 1.
35. Id., Art. 6, para. 1.
36. Id., Art. 7, para. 1.
37. Id., Art. 11, para. 2.
38. Id., Art. 12.
39. Id., Art. 13.
40. Id., Art. 7, para. 2.
Convention on the High Seas could. Both of these latter agree-
ments suffer from vagueness, and hence rights can never be prop-
erly delineated. Of course, the problem of the Convention on
Transit Trade of Land-locked Countries centers around those very
clauses that give it strength; that is to say that there are reserva-
tions by the coastal nations as to signing an instrument that
may eventually go against their national interests. Very likely, the
instrument will be used as a basis for the demands put forward
at the 1973 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas. It is
safe to say that the inland countries, with the added votes due to
their greater participation, will try to embody at least some of the
articles set forth here in a document of greater international appeal.
The Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked Countries is a
highly selective agreement; it appeals, in the main, only to those
countries which have the need for broader transit rights, that is the
inland states, and especially the under-developed inland states, who
often derive their income from volume sales. It is then a necessity
that these principles be eventually embodied in an instrument of
major international significance.
The Right to a Flag
The demand for access is often accompanied by a collateral re-
quest for the right, by land-locked nations, to sail under the au-
spices of their own national flag. This demand was conceded
to in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, where Articles 4 and 5
state:
Article 4
Every Stat whether coastal or not, has the right to sail ships
under its flag on the high seas.
Article 5
1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nation-
ality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for
the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State
whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link
between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effec-
tively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, tech-
nical and social matters over ships flying its flag.
2. Each State shall issue to ships which it has granted the right
to fly its flag documents to that effect.
This position is presented even more adamantly in the Convention
on Transit Trade of Land-locked Countries, where one of the princi-
ples upon which the agreement is based is as follows:
Principle H
In territorial and on internal waters, vessels flying the flag of
land-locked countries should have identical rights and enjoy treat-
ment identical to that enjoyed by vessels flying the flag of coastal
States other than the territorial State.
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The value of this right, in the present, is somewhat debatable, for
while it may seem justifiable as a philosophical or legal principle, as
a practical matter it offers very few immediate benefits to most of
the land-locked countries that would choose to exercise the fran-
chise. Not only would the expense associated with the application
be astronomical to the novice sea-going power, but the practicalities
of operation would be formidable. Because of the need for port
facilities, a land-locked nation would always be, to some extent,
dependent upon the coastal states. Of course, the degree of de-
pendency can vary between the inland states. Those nations hav-
ing access to the sea by water-ways which permit the passage of
ocean-going vessels, such as Switzerland and Paraguay, are in an
advantageous position when compared with those states that de-
pend totally upon overland access. Also, most inland countries
could not possibly police their vessels as Article 5, paragraph one,
of the Convention on the High Seas implies.41 Further, most sail-
ors and skilled seamen are native to the coastal states, therefore at
least reducing what foreign exchange profits might be gained.
These obstacles, though, have not completely dissuaded inland
nations from taking to the seas. Hence Switzerland carried much
of its commerce from 1923 to World War II on charter ships.42
Other nations have occasionally gone even further. For a few
years, until 1961, Uganda and Kenya shared a sea-going navy, giving
Uganda a rare distinction among inland states.43 Nevertheless,
there are much easier methods of obtaining the benefits of interna-
tional commercial vessels than by operating them under one's own
flag. Corporations and consortiums chartered in a foreign country
may solve many of the problems associated with sailing under
one's own flag. So does the registering of a vessel under the flag of
a country whose regulations in this area are particularly lax.4
41. H. MEYE=RS, THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPS 290 (1967). See comments
made during the initial formulation of the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas, supra note 26, reported in 2 Y.B. IT'TL L. CoIMnM'N 37 passim.
42. MEYERS, supra note 41 at 291. As of 1969, Burundi, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Switzerland had oceangoing merchant ships registered un-
der their flag. THE WORLDS MERCHANT FLEETS (U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Maritime Administration) at 113-14 (1969); MAww 1969: YEAR OF CHAL-
LENGE-THE ANUAL REPORT OF THE MARITnE ADmISTRATION (Dep't of
Commerce, Maritime Administration) App. II (June, 1969).
43. Nye, East African Economic Integration in INTERNATIONA POLITIcAL
Cownwuxrms 429 (1969).
44. Note, The American Merchant Marine: Flags of Convenience and
Future events may give the right more significance. It is unlikely
that we can expect a sizeable sea-going navy originating from an in-
land country, but of course interests are centered in the commercial
sphere rather than the military. The sea offers opportunitites just
as great for the inland countries as for the coastal states. There is
little doubt that in the foreseeable future at least some of the in-
land states will desire to directly participate in these advantages on
a basis equal to that of other nations.
Possibilities
The inland states, as a group, control approximately twenty per-
cent of the votes in the General Assembly. This is quite a substan-
tial number, but considering the esoteric nature of the inland states'
demands, resistance must be expected. The question still remains
as to what amount of leverage these inland states can exercise, in
order that their interests be embodied in an international agree-
ment to the maximum degree. As a practical consideration, the
majority of these nations have very little economic leverage
through which they could force concessions from allied or neighbor-
ing coastal states. Indeed, of the land-locked members of the
GATT, only four nations are attributed a percentage of world trade
that is above the absolute minimum assumed to transpire.46 Fur-
thermore, these four are European (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Lux-
embourg, and Switzerland) and hence are removed from the have-
not states of Africa, Asia, and South America. Within the latter
continents, it is far more likely to find the land-locked countries
economically dependent upon their neighbors. Hence we find
Uganda economically dependent on Kenya; Swaziland on South
Africa; Mongolia on Russia; and so on. Obviously, this economic
dependence tends to minimize the pressure that the land-locked
states can exert in the furtherance of their oceanic interests. It is
the very dependence from which these countries seek to escape that
binds them to a less militant stance. Note that the availability of
ocean transport to the coastal nations results in the existence of
alternate sources of minerals; this in itself operates as a method by
which any inland militancy can be toned down. No doubt, many
coastal states will consider it cheaper to pay the added transporta-
tion costs for materials that originate from over-seas sources than
to grant oceanic access to a non-allied, but neighboring, inland
state.
International Law, 3 VMG. J. INT'L L. 121-24; 127-36 (1963). Cf. H.B.
JAcOBINI, INTERNATIONAL LAW 121-23 (rev. ed. 1968); COLOMBOS, supra
note 11, § 309 at 290.
45. Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 172-73 (1970).
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There are also political considerations. While many inland coun-
tries may desire to obtain rights associated with the sea, it cannot be
expected that they will foresake allies or over-bearing political
powers. Hence, while Czechoslovakia and Hungary could compete
profitably in world markets, they would do so at the threat of of-
fending Russia. In fact, it can be expected that if Russia actively
seeks to prevent the formulation of an international regime, Czech-
slovakia, Byelorussian SSR, Hungary, and possibly Mongolia will
do the same. This principle could be applicable, to a lesser extent,
to those inland states which seek to preserve their strict neutrality
in international affairs. It is then possible that such countries as
Switzerland and Austria, while sympathizing with their fellow in-
land states, will not exert the degree of influence that they other-
wise could. As an aside, it is notable that there exists no military
might of any consequence among the land-locked nations, and ac-
cordingly the coastal states presently feel no threat of hostile ac-
tion. Of course, this may not always be so. As an example, Rho-
desia could possibly turn into an immediate menace to any neigh-
boring state. Eventually, so could Bolivia and Paraguay if neces-
sity existed. However, since the possibility of military action to
secure access to the sea seems remote, and there are no immediate
fears, it is unlikely that this will play any part in the considerations
of coastal nations.
All of the above factors tend to fragment the potential influence
of a unified block of inland nations. It remains to be seen whether
these considerations will, in fact, prevent meaningful gains for
these countries. The Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked
Countries and the voting patterns in the United Nations General
Assembly demonstrate at least a unification of interests by the in-
land nations. While it is likely that the Convention on Transit
Trade will serve as the basis for many demands to be made at the
1973 Conference, the reluctance of coastal nations to sign the agree-
ment lessens its international impact. Nevertheless, if the interna-
tional areas of the ocean are to be preserved for the benefit of all
mankind, it would seem preposterous to deny one fifth of the na-
tions of the world the rights of equal enjoyment.
III. NoN-LVING OCEAN REsouRcEs
Oceanic resources will undoubtedly influence international poli-
tics; if not in the immediate future, then in at least the forseeable.
The resources are both plentiful and in some instances relatively
cheap to extract. The inland countries no doubt feel that they have
a direct stake in the harvesting of these materials. Indeed, they
have often expressed a desire to participate,40 not only because of
the direct economic impact these resources may have on the world
market, but also because it is possible that they, especially the un-
der-developed nations, could utilize the exploitation of these re-
sources as a source of income. It should be noted that many of the
interests of the land-locked countries, in this regard, are identical
to the interests of under-developed countries as a whole. This is to
say that all nations, whether they be land-locked or not, wish to
take part in the sea bed exploitation. The land-locked nations,
though, have to go one step further: they must demonstrate a right
to participation based upon the fact of their existence and not upon
the physical attributes of their territory.
Presently, with the exception of hydrocarbons, the exploitation
of the sea bed resources is carried on at a very minor pace when
compared with dry land exploitation. Mineral extraction from the
sea has continued since 1852, but the lengths of the mines rarely
exceeded four miles.47 Today, to varying degrees, such resources
as phosphorous compounds, manganese, titanium, zircon, diamonds,
iron, gold, tin, sulfur, salt (sodium/chlorine), bromine, sand, gravel,
and hydrocarbons are being taken from the ocean bed.48 However,
the total value of all of these extracts per year is not as high as the
value of the sea's protein products. 49 By far the most important
products, in terms of value, are the hydrocarbon resources. Ap-
proximately twenty percent of the world's supply of petroleum
comes from the ocean bottom, 50 and with new discoveries com-
pounded with the recognition that the sea offers nearly unlimited
opportunities in this direction, there is every reason to believe that
the significance of sea bed extraction will increase tremendously
within the next few years.
Future oceanic exploitation can be expected to center around
other minerals, besides those already mentioned. Nickel, copper,
cobalt, zinc, and manganese can be forecast as among the first to be
exploited; these are minerals that partly compose the much-ac-
46. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2750 C, supra note 4.
47. Garrett, Issues in International Law Created by Scientific Develop-
ment of the Ocean Floor, 19 Sou ruEsTnax L. REv. 101 (1965).
48. Fye, Maxwell, Emery, Ketchum, Ocean Science and Marine Re-
sources, in USES OF THE SEA 50-51 (ed. E. Gulion, for the American Assem-
bly, 1968) (hereinafter cited as Fye).
49. Id.
50. Kaufman, Seabed Technology, 5 TnxAs Izr. L.F. 195 (1969).
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claimed manganese nodules.51 In addition, it is possible that profit-
able returns may be received from the development of marine
sources of platinum and most heavy metals.52 Regardless of the
time in which the production of any of these minerals achieves a
level that could produce significant effects on the international
markets, it is mandatory that the land-locked nations act now in
securing their rights. The very fact that our technology in marine
resource development exists at such a state that production is feasi-
ble implies that belated attempts to secure oceanic resource rights
will result, to a large extent, in failure. It is apparent that those
countries which have invested large sums of money into the devel-
opment of sea resources will not easily let go of the proceeds re-
ceived. If the inland countries are to finalize the interests which
they feel are due to them, they must do so at the 1973 United Na-
tions Conference on Law of the Sea.
Economics
The United Nations has expressed the intent that the sea not only
be used for peaceful purposes, but also that the development of
marine resources be undertaken with all countries, whether de-
veloped or under-developed, coastal or land-locked, taking part.53
However, no consensus exists as to what the actual impact of these
resources will be. This information is especially important to the
land-locked states because of the added expenses they must suffer
on the open market due to overland transportation costs. Bolivia
and Czechoslovakia had this in mind when they urged the General
Assembly of the United Nations to take special measures so that
all land-locked nations would be protected from adverse economic
reactions.
54
Early estimates of the return that could be expected from marine
resource exploitation often approached magnificent sums.55 This
51. Id., Brooks, Deep Sea Manganese Nodules: From Scientific Phenom-
enon To World Resource, 8 NATURAL RESOuRCE J. 401 (1968). See generally
Mero, Mineral Deposits in the Sea, 1 NATuRAL RESOURCE LAw 130 (1968).
52. See Fye, supra note 48.
53. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of
the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,
U.N. Doc. A/7230 (1968).
54. 8 U.N. MOTmHLY CHRON. (No. 1) 40 (1971).
55. See Pardo, Who Will Control the Seabed, 47 FOREIGN ArrA.ms (No. 1)
123-37 (1968).
unbridled enthusiasm has been somewhat cooled by the recogni-
tion of economic realities by the forecasters. However, it is obvi-
ous that many of the more developed countries are giving the ex-
ploitation potential of the ocean floor serious consideration. Where
governments have been slow to act, private sectors have taken the
initiative. Hughes Tool Company has announced that construction
is already under way on a three hundred and twenty-four foot
barge and a five hundred and sixty-five foot mining vessel to be
used in the harvesting of manganese nodules.56 The vessels are
designed to be operational at depths from twelve thousand feet to
approximately eighteen thousand feet under the surface of the
ocean. This means the vessel has mining capabilities that extend
far beyond the continental shelf and well into international waters.
Note that as recently as 1966 the United States' under-sea mining
operations were conducted at depths of merely one thousand feet.57
Other than the hydrocarbons, manganese nodules have evoked
the most fascination from potential investors. It has been approxi-
mated that one ship could mine as many as four thousand tons of
nodules in a day if it was operating within a rich field of the
nodules.58 The nodules, which rest upon the sea floor, can congre-
gate in amounts as large as two pounds per square foot. As has
previously been mentioned, the nodules contain several other min-
erals, in varying concentrations, along with the high content of
manganese. Furthermore, there is some evidence to support the
contention that these nodules are being manufactured on the ocean
floor at a faster rate than we are using the materials on a yearly
basis.59 Although this natural manufacturing of the nodules could
not replace the present concentrations that we can expect to find, it
would still make the supply nearly inexhaustive at our present
rate of consumption.
Predictions as to what the direct economic effects would be if
mass exploitation were undertaken may be both misleading and
inaccurate; nevertheless, such studies have been attempted. At
56. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 17, 1972, § 1 at 3, col. 4. See generally
Auburn, The International Seabed Area, 20 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 173-76
(1971).
57. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND
RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND TH= SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION 134
(1969) (hereinafter cited as CommISSiON REPORT).
58. F. Christy, Alternative Regimes for the Minerals on the Sea Floor 3-5
(Manuscript submitted to American Bar Association, National Institute on
Marine Resources, June 8, 1967). See Mero, A Legal Regime for Deepsea
Mining, 7 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 488, 498-99 (1970); J. M o, THE MINERAL RE-
SOURCES OF THE SEA (1965).
59. Fye, supra note 48 at 37.
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present levels of consumption and with the full utilization of pres-
ent technology behind a mining effort, it has been calculated that
on the world market manganese would drop as much as fifty per-
cent in price. Likewise, cobalt prices would be reduced as much as
thirty percent, and nickel about five percent.60 Zinc, copper and
lead can also be expected to suffer a reciprocal drop in price, al-
though perhaps not as accentuated.
If the world prices did fall in accordance with the above esti-
mations, the consequences could be drastic to many inland states.
Even if free access to the sea tempted a land-locked country to com-
pete in the exploitation of these minerals, the costs would un-
doubtedly be prohibitive and the advantages minimal.61 Necessity
dictates that inland countries who rely primarily on the export of
the minerals mentioned for their income seek strong controls and
agreements that would guarantee international cooperation. If this
cooperation is not forthcoming, Uganda can expect drastic effects
on the sale of its nickel and copper. Bolivia's lead, cobalt, copper
and zinc exports would likely be subject to the same fate.62 The
inland countries that could face such a situation are, of course, nu-
merous. The effect could be even more pronounced where inland
countries (and all developing countries) have resources that are as
yet not at a competitive state of production. Foreseeably, much
money would be invested in marine resources rather than in these
countries where many investments are tempered by political over-
tones and factors of this nature. The inland countries would be es-
pecially hard hit because of the reluctance of investors to tackle the
complex transportation problems associated with land-locked states.
Land-locked states face a totally different problem when hy-
drocarbons are considered. Controls there would be sought, not
to control the market so that prices might be kept up, but rather
so that prices may be kept down. Not one of the inland states is a
petroleum producer of any consequence, although a very small mi-
60. Christy, Alternative Regimes, supra note 58, at 3-5. See Mero, A
Legal Regime, supra note 58, at 496-97; Schaefer, Prospective Rates of De-
velopment, supra note 2, at 71-98; Brooks, Deep Sea Manganese Nodules,
supra note 51, at 407-12.
61. See Christy, Alternative Regimes, supra note 58.
62. See 4 MmnERALs YEARBooK (U.S. Dep't of the Int., 1968) for com-
prehensive analyses of international mineral production on a state by
state basis.
nority do have fledgling industries. But again, even these young
industries will probably contribute very little to world trade. For
this reason, it is probably in the interest of the majority of inland
states to insure themselves of either a continuing source of petro-
leum at a low price or international controls through which they
can profit, that is some sort of income return from those resources
outside of national jurisdictions. Either method would accomplish
the same end.
The development of oceanic hydrocarbons will probably be the
hardest problem to bring under international control. Not only is
the potential market extensive, but nationalism will undoubtedly
play a very important part in any international debate on the sub-
ject. Massive oil discoveries beyond the continental shelf, yet
clearly within a nation's interests, will serve to complicate the mat-
ter even further. The recent discovery off Nova Scotia, estimated
to extend all the way from Sable Island to the Carolinas in the
United States, is a case in point.63 It seems very unlikely that the
United States and Canada will allow foreign exploitation of any
kind upon these resources. The inland nations, in the majority,
here have interests that diverge from many of the shelf-locked and
under-developed states. The primary interest of these countries is
to see that the hydrocarbon resources are actually developed at the
very slowest pace. Many of the shelf-locked and under-developed
states are petroleum producers and hence seek to retain their in-
come sources. 64 Accommodation through international agreements
must take cognizance of all the interests involved, yet it is this very
diversity in national interests that will weaken the probability that
specific desires are included.
63. TIwE, Jan. 3, 1972, at 62. As to the potentiality of nationalistic as-
sertions towards hydrocarbons beyond the continental shelf see, e.g., Recent
Developments in Law of the Seas: A Synopsis, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637-38
(1970). See also Gaskell, Oil Interests in the Deep-Seabed, in THE LAW OF
THE SEA: NATIONAL PoLIcY RECOMMENDATIONS 95 (Proceedings of the
Fourth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1969); Finlay,
The Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area:
The American Petroleum Institute Position, 4 NATuRAL RESOURcES LAw. 73
(1971). Compare Declaration of Montevideo, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1081
(1970) (Latin American statement in respect to the seas adjacent to their
coasts ) with the Convention on the Continental Shelf [1964] pt. 1, U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958;
entered into force June 10, 1964. See generally U.N. FOOD AND AGRXCULTURAL
ORGANIZATION, LnVTs AND STATus OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA, ExcLusIvE FIsH-
ING ZoNES, FIsHEy CONSERvATION ZoNES AND T=E CONTINENTAL SHELP (Cir-
cular No. 127, 1971); 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1255, 1258-71 (1971) (National
claims to sea bed resources).
64. Newton, Seabed Resources: The Problem of Adolescence, 8 SAN
DIEo L. REv. 551, 569 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Newton).
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Ramifications
If an international regime of the seas is to be a governing body
with actual authority, it is obvious that this authority must be
based upon power vested by the various nations. Of the nations
that make up the United Nations General Assembly, by far the ma-
jority are under-developed, and therefore lack the capability to ex-
ploit the seas to any large degree. The initial investment in a full-
scale oceanic development program will undoubtedly involve large
quantities of money, and further, technological accomplishments be-
yond the abilities of any small or under-developed nation.6 5 Fore-
seeably, the results of unchecked mass exploitaton would then es-
tablish a perfect example of the rich getting richer and the poor
poorer. To remedy the inequities of rich nations placing their
money into marine resource development rather than in the coffers
of the under-developed nations, several novel solutions have been
proposed.
The idea that has attracted the most attention would establish a
system of administration whereby exploitation licenses would be is-
sued for specific areas of the ocean floor. Income received from the
issuance would then enter a fund, with distribution directed at
those states which have the greatest economic need.66 To the in-
land nations, such a method of administration has faults if string-
ent and practical controls are not adopted. Being deprived of a
market for their earth resources, the incomes received would, at the
most, compensate for the losses. Extrapolated in the future, it
would mean that many of their earth resources would never be
developed at all, depriving them of being able to establish a self-
sufficient economy. Furthermore, their coastal neighbors would
65. ComvIissioN REPORT, supra note 57, at 135. See, e.g., Report of the
Secretary General of the United Nations Economic and Social Council on
the Resources of the Sea at 38-55, E/4449/Add.1 (1968) for an evaluation
of the technological and scientific prerequisites to sea bed exploration for
minerals and ores.
66. See generally TE LAW OF THE SEA: NATIONAL POLICY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 2-187 (Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference of the Law of the
Sea Institute, 1969); Knight, The Draft United Nations Convention on the
International Seabed Area: Background and Some Preliminary Thoughts,
8 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 459 (1971); Newton, Seabed Resources, supra note 64,
at 551. See also A. HOLICK, MARIE PO LIcY, LAW, AN ECONOMICS: THE
1960's (an annotated bibliography released through the Law of the Sea
Institute, 1970).
grow economically at an inproportionate rate due to the added in-
comes they would receive from the exploitation of their marine and
shelf resources. Besides the political overtones, that is, a land-
locked nation situated next to a richer and developing nation, it is
obvious that the inland country would eventually become de-
pendent not only on neighboring coastal nations, but also on the
developed nations who could afford sea bed resource development.
It would be an understatement to say that this would be quite un-
attractive to many nations so situated. Many of the younger na-
tions are now asserting their new-found nationalism; to these states,
such a form of neo-colonialism would be untenable. If such a re-
gime were to succeed, it would have to be based on the premise
that marine exploitation would be a secondary function. Its pri-
mary purpose would be to control markets for the benefit of the in-
land countries. Of course, economic restructuring would elimi-
nate many of the problems mentioned. But the fact remains that
the majority of inland countries are now operating at subsistence
levels and therefore, for all practical purposes, economic realign-
ment is impossible. 67 It is inconceivable that such countries as
Chad or Zambia could become self-sufficient solely by processed-
goods production in the manner Switzerland has.
A proposal suggested by W. Frank Newton deserves some merit.
Mr. Newton considers the possibility of dividing up the interna-
tional areas of the ocean floor between all countries.08 He would
allocate certain areas for developing countries, and others for de-
veloped countries and thereby allow the lesser powers to have con-
trol over their own economic interests. The exploiters would have
to deal directly with the developing country, and could only ex-
ploit the areas through licenses. He further suggests that a sys-
tem could be set up whereby a more developed nation would have
proportionately less licenses to distribute than a lesser developed
nation. The number of licenses that a developed nation then could
issue would go up in accordance to the amounts issued by the de-
veloping states. To an inland state, this would very likely be the
best of all possible methods of marine resource distribution. Their
stake in oceanic resources would be real and not illusory. As a
body, they would have control over the development of their own
resources and rather than continually be fighting the market im-
67. See, e.g., Samir Development and Structural Change: The African
Experience 1950-1970, 24 J. INT'L AEVAms 203 (1970); Processes and Prob-
lems of Industrialization in Under-developed Countries, U.N. Doc. E/2670/
ST (1955). Georgulas, Operational Problems in African Rural Development
Planning, 8 DEVEL OP MENT DIGEST (No. 2) 61 (1971).
68. Newton, supra note 61 at 568.
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pact of sea resources, they would actually be sharing in the pro-
ceeds. Although such a plan would be desirable to most inland
states, it is unlikely that the developed states would endorse the
method of distribution. Special covenants in international agree-
ments would have to be drawn up to prevent oceanic nationalism.
It would not be too far-fetched to imagine states, especially the
coastal states, claiming ownership of hydrocarbon facilities or re-
voking licenses. Politically, Mr. Newton's plan can be expected to
meet stiff opposition if it is presented at all. The fear of nationalis-
tic assertions and the fact that the developed nations do not act
through wholly altruistic motives will likely defeat an otherwise
brilliant idea.
Assuming that some feasible plan can be constructed which
would embody the necessary income and market controls, the land-
locked countries will nevertheless consider their representation on
any international regime a crucial objective. Proper controls
within an instrument of international significance would be quite
valueless if they were not accompanied by some means of enforce-
ment and administration, whereby the interests of the land-locked
countries could be effectively expressed. As can be expected, the
timeliness of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas
has evoked a number of proposals, both national and private, that
seek to equitably distribute authority among the various interest
groups. The proposals deserve some consideration, for it is upon
these proposals that a compromise concerning the establishment of
an international regime will eventually be based.
E. Brown, a noted commentator in the area of ocean resources
and politics, has produced an illustrative model that he feels em-
bodies the principles of equitable representation. 9 In his model,
Mr. Brown draws up provisions for the establishment of two bodies.
One body would determine the actual appropriation of funds re-
ceived from the exploitation of the seas, that is, the income receiving
arrangements. The other body would determine how the funds are
to be allocated. In the first body, or the Governing Body, forty-
three sectors would be represented, and out of these forty-three sec-
69. Brown, Our Nation and the Sea: A Comment on the Proposed Legal-
Political Framework for the Development of Submarine Mineral Resources
in THE LAw or THE SEA: NATIONAL POLICY RECOmmENDATiONS 2, 45-49
(Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea
Institute, 1969).
tors the land-locked states would be appropriated one seat. In the
second body, the Fund Governing Body, the land-locked and shelf-
locked states would receive one seat out of a possible thirty-seven.
The remainder in both instances would go to technologically ad-
vanced and developing states. Decisions would be made by ma-
jority vote for both bodies. There are some readily observable
criticisms in Mr. Brown's model. (It is only fair to note that the
model is in no way intended to solve all ramifications or complexi-
ties that could arise; its purpose, although it is well-researched and
supported, is speculative). 7O Of primary importance to the land-
locked states is the model's propensity to group them with shelf-
locked countries. Although there is no doubt that in many in-
stances their interests will be identical, there are also some cases in
which conflict can arise. This is especially evident in the Fund
Governing Body where Mr. Brown apportions the authority in such
a manner that it appears that the land-locked states will share com-
mon desires with shelf-locked states. Many of the Middle-East oil
producing countries are shelf-locked and will therefore seek to dis-
suade high seas petroleum investment. On the other hand, most
land-locked countries have no vested interest in land-based hy-
drocarbons, and will therefore seek to increase petroleum produc-
tion so that they might share in the receipts. Mineral resource de-
velopment will produce an opposite confrontation in many in-
stances.
Ambassador Pardo seems more aware of the problems and con-
flicts that must be faced by the land-locked countries. He would
give them, in his model, twenty percent of the total vote."1 This
would approximate the voting power that these countries hold in
the United Nations General Assembly, and therefore increase the
likelihood of passage of an international regime if passage were
based upon unconditional terms. This agreement would surely
draw support from the majority of inland countries since their vote
would be one of substance, and not a mere token. Furthermore, in
Ambassador Pardo's simple scheme, the technologically developed
nations would receive forty percent of the votes, with the re-
mainder going to the developing nations. This would indicate that
where conflict arose between any two groups, the interests of the
inland states could be well served because an alliance with these
states would involve a substantial number of votes. Beneficiaries
of this tactic would be primarily the African and Asian land-locked
states, who have many interests in common.
70. Id. at 47, n.133.
71. Pardo, Commentary, in TnE LAw OF THE SEA: THE UNITED NATIONS
AND OcF AN MANAGEmNrT 23, 28 (Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Confer-
ence of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1970).
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The most comprehensive proposal to date appears to be the
United States "Draft United Nations Convention on the Interna-
tional Seabed Area."72 The United States proposal develops inter-
national control around two governing bodies: the Assembly and
the Council. The Assembly would be composed of all contracting
parties to the Convention. 3 Its authority would go to the proce-
dures to be followed by the regime and to making recommenda-
tions as to policy. The Council would be the real source of author-
ity in the United States proposal. Membership would be limited to
twenty-four parties, of which six would be the most industrially ad-
vanced states.74 The remaining eighteen seats would be filled by
representatives from at least twelve developing states and two seats
by representatives from land-locked or shelf-locked states.75
The United States proposal, unlike the two previously mentioned,
does not limit the representation to only two seats. It rather leaves
open the possibility that the Council representation may have sev-
eral land-locked countries, providing only that a minimum of two
members must be from land-locked or shelf-locked states. In this
regard, the United States proposal will very likely appear attrac-
tive to the inland countries. The provisions allow the land-locked
states to expand their political base if events are such that a com-
mon problem among these states can be solved by unification.
The proposals mentioned are, in varying degrees, representative of
all the international regime formulations that will be given serious
consideration in 1973.76 It should be noted that the land-locked
and shelf-locked countries have drawn up a proposal that would
divide the authority of an international regime equally between
themselves and the coastal states. The proposal is obviously self-
serving and deserves little consideration. It is quite obvious that
the coastal states would reject such a total annihilation of their au-
72. Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area,
U.N. Doc. No. AC/138/25; 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIAL 1046 (1970). See Knight,
The Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area,
supra note 66.
73. Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area,
supra note 72, at Art. 34.
74. Id., Art. 36 and App. E.
75. Id., Art. 36.
76. See Sohn, The Council of an International Sea-bed Authority, 9 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 404 (1972), for a detailed discussion of international regime
proposals.
thority.77 While all formulas seem to recognize the necessity of
representation by inland states, they differ as to what actual au-
thority will be allocated among these states. The paramount ob-
jective of these nations in 1973 will be the maximization of their in-
fluence within any administrative system.
In this regard, it is important to note that, whether the sea bed is
eventually controlled directly by a United Nations' administered
board, or by a system of ocean floor allocation, the license fees or
royalties cannot be so high as to dissuade investment. If fees are
set at a rate incommensurable with profitable investment, it is ap-
parent that the countries capable of marine resource exploitation
will merely ignore any international covenants, leaving the inland
and developing states with a white elephant.78 They will, instead,
concentrate their technology on the development of resources
within their territorial waters. Results of this situation might not
be felt for years, as several of the developed states do not have
extensive resources on their shores; but it is safe to assume that
technological advances will make even these resources extractable.
With the several developed nations of the world working towards
the exploitation of minerals, independently of any international
controls, the other countries will eventually not only lose their mar-
kets for earth resources, but also the technological training neces-
sary for marine resource development. To remedy this, the land-
locked states must retain some control over sea floor development.
If not received, they can expect their interests to be secondary to
the interests of all other nations. Also, policing exploitation is of
great concern to the land-locked and shelf-locked nations. Since
these nations cannot profit in any manner by the abrogation of the
international law of the seas, it is of primary importance to them to
see that others also do not. For this reason those laws that will per-
tain to policing exploitation in international waters must be care-
fully drawn up, with due consideration given to the practicalities of
enforcement. While the consequences that these minerals will have
77. Preliminary Working-Papers Concerning Matters to be Regulated in
an International Sea-Bed Convention (Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Hun-
gary, Nepal, Netherlands, and Singapore), U.N. Doc. A/AC.1381/55; 10
INT'L LEGAL iAMERIALS 1011 (1971). Compare Preliminary Working Papers
with Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal, dated March 6, 1956,
U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/99 Add.6; 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMm'N § 16 at 62 (1956). As
to the initial formulation of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, supra
note 26, the letter stated in part: "In view of her geographical situation
as a landlocked country, Nepal has very little concern with the [Provisional
Articles Concerning the Regime of the High Seas]."
78. See, e.g., Bernfeld, Developing the Resources of the Sea: Security of
Investment, 1 NATuRAL RESOURCE LAW 82 (1968); see also Gaskell, Oil In-
terests in the Deep-Seabed, supra note 63.
[voL. 9:701, 1972] Landlocked Nations
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
on the international market may seem dubious now, there is no
doubt that in the near future, when exploitation is conducted on a
massive scale, that policing arrangements may make the difference
between meaningful and wholly inadequate international law.
Whatever the plan adopted, if some settlement is not arrived at
soon the land-locked states can expect to take a backseat in the de-
velopment of marine resources for many years to come. Their in-
terests would be far better served by having an international ad-
ministration that suffers because of weakness than to be faced with
the prospects of having no body to which they can turn at all.
Given an authority with at least potential power, the substantial
votes of the land-locked countries could eventually be exercised to
obtain a considerable amount of leverage in the United Nations,
and these states could thereby obtain some satisfaction in the fu-
ture. Furthermore, as the mineral extraction of the sea becomes
more substantial, it can be expected that the vast majority of
smaller nations in the world will demand that any international re-
gime retain more authority for itself.
IV. CONCLUSION
The land-locked nations' primary concern in 1973 will be the
implementation of an international regime that will adequately
represent their special interests. Since it is commonly accepted
that those waters outside national territorial jurisdiction are re-
served for the benefit of mankind, the real question will revolve
around the quantity of representation and not the fact of represen-
tation itself. This is based on the assumption that a meaningful
agreement is reached at all.
In reference to the establishmenT of an international regime, it
has been stated that "[t] he landlocked states would seem to be the
least difficult to please, be they developed or developing.179 This
attitude not only seems prevalent among writers, but it seems to be
based on a great deal of common sense. In consideration of the
past accomplishments of those inland countries which sought rep-
resentation in this area, it is logical to assume that those who have
had so little before will now settle for even token participation.
Furthermore, it is surely arguable that the interests of the land-
79. Brown, Our Nation and the Sea, supra note 69, at 31.
locked countries (and the shelf-locked) are less than the coastal
states, developed or not, because of the direct nature of the littoral
states' interests. This is to say that the land-locked states will have
a lesser concern for those agreements and covenants that pertain
to shipping, international straits and conduct on the high seas. The
interests of the land-locked states is less, not because they may not
participate,80 but because many of these states will not participate.
Obviously, very few of the inland states can afford the costs asso-
ciated with many marine enterprises. Geo-political realities and
prerequisites may prohibit the complete utilization of oceanic
rights.8 ' The present value of inland representation, for most coun-
tries, must be measured as an investment in the future rather than
as an immediate boon.
However, the above argument centers on advantages that can be
expected; it does not consider the apparent harmful results that sea
bed exploitation can promulgate. It is possible economic injury
which has aroused the recent clamor by the developing nations,
especially the shelf-locked and land-locked. This view was aptly
expressed by Arvid Pardo, Ambassador of Malta to the United
States, when he stated:
It is in vain, however, to hope that such a regime can receive wide
support among the poorer countries without provisions effectively
protecting some of their most vital interests; of special importance
among these is equitable participation in the economic benefits that
can be derived from the exploitation of resources of the seabed, ef-
fective protection of land-locked sources of minerals against de-
structive competition, and easier access to the results of scientific
research, these requirements of many of the poorer countries of
the world can only be effectively implemented through the estab-
lishment of appropriate international institutional machinery with
powers to supervise and to some extent regulate the activities of
States with regard to the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. If
such machinery does not form part of an international regime, many
countries would prefer to extend their national jurisdiction as cir-
cumstances may suggest, and then to exploit the resources of the
area claimed by hiring the necessary technology.8 2
Of course, the land-locked countries have no national jurisdiction
to extend, but they do have a significant block of votes in the
80. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 29, at Art. 2. But see
G. SC WA=ZNBERGER, A MAxuAL or INTERNA iONAL Lw 137-38 (5th ed.
1967).
81. Communist versus non-communist situations present the most evi-
dent examples of geo-political realities preventing a country from exercis-
ing oceanic rights with complete freedom. Other considerations by an
inland country in this respect may be more subtle. Hence a country
seeking to preserve its neutrality may find that flying its flag on the
open sea, or even within territorial waters of a third country, offers an
opportunity to potential aggressors.
82. Pardo, Commentary, supra note 71, at 27.
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United Nations General Assembly. Mr. Pardo's statement very
adequately describes the fears of the shelf-locked and land-locked
nations, and it can be assumed that a majority of the inland coun-
tries will exercise their votes in a manner that will ensure repre-
sentation commensurate with their interests. The significance of
the inland states' United Nations voting power has been recog-
nized in a variety of ways. Almost all proposals for international
regimes, to some degree, include a number of "seats" for inland
representation. This is an optimistic sign, but it still remains to be
seen whether the representation can be combined with a relevant
degree of authority. The establishment of a meaningful interna-
tional convention in 1973 is by no means assured.
Any convention will, of course, face some political opposition.
Russia has, in the past, shown very little incentive to formulate an
international regime.8 3 However, in recent months, even this oppo-
sition has been modified.8 4 Nevertheless, the fact that the land-
locked states are now taking a stronger stance and that typical pro-
posals for international regimes recognize their interests, indi-
cates that any international authority would probably include these
states among their membership.
All of the numerous problems that will arise have not been dis-
cussed. The writer sought here, only to show what common in-
terests these countries do have, and may have some time in the fu-
ture. There are many examples of political conflicts that could
prevent any specific inland nation from either expressing its posi-
tion or exercising rights. Economic necessity or agreement may
prevent a land-locked country from opposing a neighbor. Further-
more, while the land-locked nations may have common interests,
political animosity may prevent any unification in this area.
83. See Butler, Some Recent Developments in Soviet Maritime Law, in
TbE LAW OF THE SE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND OCEAN1T MANAGEiMvENT 375
(Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Insti-
tute, 1970). See also Newcombe, Ross, Newcomb, United Nations Voting
Patterns, 24 INT'L ORGANIZATION 100 (1970); W. BUTLER, THE SoVIET UNiON
AND THE LAW OF THE SPA (1970), reviewed in 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 180 (1970).
See generally Dole & Stang, Ocean Politics at the United Nations, 50 ORE.
L. REV. 378 (1971); Friedham & Kadane, Quantitative Content Analysis of
the United Nations Seabed Debate: Methodology and a Continental Shelf
Case Study, 24 INT'L ORGANIZATION 479 (1970).
84. Provisional Draft Articles of a Treaty on the Use of the Sea-bed for
Peaceful Purposes (U.S.S.R.), U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/43; 10 INT'L LEGAL
IVrATERAms 994 (1971).
There are many topics that could be discussed, such as the extent
of the international area, practical methods of participation by
the land-locked countries, and the practical ramifications of exercis-
ing rights under an international regime in which all the countries
of the world are not parties or represented. The inland states must
take inventory of their problems; the United Nations must make
extensive market analyses to determine economic impact. The
time is quickly approaching when decisions may come too late. It
is apparent that our land-based resources are diminishing,8 5 yet
many of the developing countries rely on the scarcity of goods to
drive the price up-and hence their income. These problems will
have to be resolved, and it is just possible that under the new Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, a man with
a reputation for aggressiveness, the 1973 Conference on the seas
may establish a regime in which all interests are adequately repre-
sented.
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